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Abstract
We analyse credit market equilibrium when banks screen loan applicants.
When banks have a convex cost function of screening, a pure strategy equi-
librium exists where banks optimally set interest rates at the same level
as their competitors. This result complements Broecker’s (1990) analysis,
where he demonstrates that no pure strategy equilibrium exists when banks
have zero screening costs. In our set up we show that interest rate on loans
are largely independent of marginal costs, a feature consistent with the
extant empirical evidence. In equilibrium, banks make positive proﬁts in
our model in spite of the threat of entry by inactive banks. Moreover, an
increase in the number of active banks increases credit risk and so does
not improve credit market eﬃciency: this point has important regulatory
implications. Finally, we extend our analysis to the case where banks have
diﬀering screening abilities.
Key words: Interbank competition, screening, credit risk, adverse selec-
tion.
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1. Introduction
This paper explores the nature of equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information
when banks are able to screen their customers. Information asymmetries are central to credit
markets. There is nowadays a basic agreement among academics that banks exist because they
monitor ﬁrms (Diamond, 1984; Gale and Hellwig, 1985; Holmstr¨ om and Tirole, 1993). Hence,
models of the credit market should incorporate a screening-monitoring role for banks. It is
widely appreciated that introducing asymmetric information into models of the credit market
yields equilibria with speciﬁc features. Contributions like those of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981),
Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992) exhibit equilibrium phenomena such as credit rationing and ex
post monopoly of information, which are absent from standard delivery-versus-payment markets.
Still, credit market models seem seldom to acknowledge the importance of screening. This
creates an apparent schism between models of bank/ﬁrm contracts, where screening is cen-
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tral, and models of the credit market, where screening is typically non-existent. Fortunately,
Broecker’s (1990) model provides a bridge between the two by exploring credit market equilib-
rium when banks screen ﬁrms. However, in Broecker’s equilibrium banks use mixed strategies
to assign interest rates for loans. This is an unattractive feature for two reasons. First, it yields
no empirical implications; second, it makes it diﬃcult to study the comparative statics or the
welfare properties of the model. Hence, although Broecker’s elegant contribution is a step in
the right direction, we think that it is worth devoting some eﬀort to extending it.
The intuition behind Broecker’s contribution is straightforward. When banks screen loan
applicants, the order in which ﬁrms approach banks is important. Rational ﬁrms will apply
ﬁrstly to the banks which post the lowest interest rates. As a result, a bank may ensure by
lowering its interest rate that it has ﬁrst choice from the population of loan applicants. So the
bank simultaneously alters the price at which it lends, and the marginal cost of lending. Hence
a bank may be able to proﬁt by undercutting its competitors. Setting price equal to marginal
cost in the traditional way may therefore not yield an equilibrium. This is at odds with standard
microeconomic theory and hence opens new avenues for exploration. This is precisely the object
of our paper.
Our work is primarily motivated by the divide between the theoretical justiﬁcation for banks
and current models of the credit market. In spanning the divide, we wish to address three speciﬁc
points.
Firstly, mixed strategy equilibria are rather unsatisfying in the context of price competition.
Once interest rates realize, banks would always want to change them immediately. For example,
the bank with the lowest interest rate would always prefer to increase it. Moreover, the empirical
evidence does not support the conclusion than bank loan rates move erratically all of the time.
Finally, it is obviously impossiblee to derive empirical predictions from mixed strategy equilibria.
Secondly, we wish to understand whether the credit market should be thought of as a
“natural monopoly”. If so, credit market equilibria should be characterised by equilibrium
proﬁts. This question is related to the relationship between competition and ﬁnancial stability,
which has been investigated in models where banks have the choice of their riskiness levels (as
for example in Matutes and Vives, 2000), but never in a set-up where the level of screening and
of credit risk in the banking industry is endogenous because it depends on the number of banks
an applicant is able to visit.
Finally, we wish to explore the potential for equilibrium credit rationing when the cost of
bank screening is explicitly modeled.
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Clearly, the answers to these points will inform regulatory attitudes towards credit market
entry, and hence will have important policy implications. We address these issues in a model
of a credit market in which banks face an adverse selection problem due to heterogeneity in
ﬁrm repayment probabilities. We assume that banks have to rely upon active monitoring when
responding to a ﬁrm’s application for a loan. The monitoring technology is imperfect and
independent across banks. Banks must account for the fact that their loan applicants may have
already been rejected by other banks. In particular, a single bank oﬀering the lowest interest
rates will on average attract better applicants than banks charging higher interest rates.
We extend Broecker’s framework by assuming that banks incur a screening cost which
is increasing and convex in the number of applicants which they screen. A simple example
would be a capacity constraint which renders it very costly (or just simply impossible) to
screen all applicants. Our main result is that pure strategy equilibria exist for suﬃciently
convex screening costs. While this is interesting, it is perhaps unsurprising. With convex
screening costs, undercutting one’s competitors in order to gain market share and an improved
applicant pool may be discouraged by the consequential increase in screening costs. It is less
clearly obvious however that the equilibrium is characterised by indeterminancy, as banks can
coordinaate on a number of diﬀerent interest rates. This is an interesting feature of our model,
as it implies that equilibrium is largely independent of marginal costs. This point is supported
by empirical researcg: see, among others, Hannan and Berger (1991) and Mester (1994).
It is also worth emphasising the existence in our model of equilibrium proﬁts for incumbent
banks. This contrasts with Broecker’s result that, with suﬃciently many banks, the mixed
equilibrium yields zero proﬁts for all banks. Our model has a number of free entry equilibria,
characterised by diﬀering numbers of active banks. The more banks which decide to be active in
equilibrium, the lower the average quality of borrowers and the higher the equilibrium interest
rate charged by all of them. We show that welfare is decreasing in the number of active banks.
The reason for this is that a bad project has more chance of securing a loan when there are
more banks. Hence an increase in the number of active banks raises the equilibrium level of
credit risk. Hence, our paper provides a new argument in support of the common statement
that regulators should restrict entry to the banking sector. Moreover, we show in section 6 that
a mild equilibrium reﬁnement predicts that the maximal number of banks enters. This adds
additional force to our policy suggestion.
Finally, we introduce some element of natural oligopoly to our model by examining the
case where banks diﬀer in their screening ability. We show that an inferior bank suﬀers losses
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whenever a superior bank charges the same or a lower interest rate. When interest rates are the
same, the reason is that high quality borrowers will in the ﬁrst instance approach the lender
with the superior screening technology while low quality borrowers will approach the other bank.
Hence the bank with a comparatively weaker screening technology will also face an inferior pool
of borrowers. When interest rates diﬀer the bank with the weaker screening technology will
face a weaker pool of borrowers because all have already been rejected by the bank with the
stronger technology. We characterise the equilibria in section 7.
Our work is related to a number of papers. Firstly, as discussed at length above, Broecker
(1990) models price competition amongst banks with a zero screening cost, and shows that the
only equilibria are in mixed strategies. His results have been widely discussed in the lending
literature (von Thadden, 2004) and extended by Dell’Ariccia, Friedman, and Marquez (1999)
to analyze entry in the banking industry and by Marquez (2002) to explore the eﬀect of in-
creased competition on the quality of credit. Pure strategy equilibria obtain in our model for
a suﬃciently convex screening cost function. This result is slightly related to Riordan (1993),
who proves the existence of pure strategy equilibrium when banks receive signals from a con-
tinuous distribution and interest rates are charged conditional on the signal (which allows price
discrimination).
Secondly, our results bear a direct relationship to the substantial literature which has argued
that welfare is enhanced by allowing banks to obtain non-competitive rents, since this provides
banks with the right incentives. This could be a result of horizontal diﬀerentiation (Chiappori
et al., 1995, and Matutes and Vives, 2000), because banks choose then to reduce the risk of
the assets (Suarez, 1998, Matutes and Vives, 2000), or because they extract ex post rents from
their lending relationships (Sharpe, 1990, Rajan, 1992, von Thadden, 1994). The possibility
that competition may be ineﬃcient is also acknowledged by Petersen and Rajan (1995), as in
their model a more competitive banking market is not necessarily a more eﬃcient one because
competition makes it harder for young ﬁrms to build banking relationships and hence to obtain
a loan.
In our model, proposition 1 shows that increased bank competition may be ineﬃcient for an
entirely diﬀerent reason: namely, that more projects will be funded in equilibrium when there
are more banks. As a result, credit risk will increase and so too will interest rates. Empirical
support for these ﬁndings is provided by Shaﬀer (1998), who ﬁnds that “Among mature banks,
those operating in less concentrated banking markets experience signiﬁcantly higher chargeoﬀ
rates for commercial loans and for total loans” (p.389). Thus, the policy implication of our
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results is that it might be eﬃcient to restrict entry into the credit market, as this reduces the
number of chances for poor borrower to obtain funds.
Emons’ (2001) work on house insurance is also related to our paper. He presents a model in
which house owners can apply for insurance from multiple providers withou investing in safety
measures. As a result, both prices and the number of damage claims are higher in competitive
markets than in a monopolistic setting. In Switzerland and Germany some regions have a
monopolistic insurance market, while others are competitive. Emons provides evidence from
these markets which is consistent with his theory.
We present our analysis as follows. Section 2 describes a model of a credit market in which
loan applications and loan screening are costly. Section 3 demonstrates the existence in our
model of pure strategy equilibria for an exogenously given number of banks; section 4 provides
a numerical example of the equilibrium, and comparative statics are derived in section 5. In
sections 6 and 7 we analyze extensions to the respective cases with free entry and heterogeneous
bank monitoring skills. Section 8 concludes.
2. The Model
Our model is a modiﬁed version of Broecker (1990). We consider a credit market with a
continuum [0,1] of risk-neutral ﬁrms, each of which wishes to borrow $1 to invest in a project
which will return $X if it succeeds and $0 if it fails. The success probability of type a ﬁrms is
pa and of type b ﬁrms is pb, where 0 ≤ pa < pb ≤ 1. A ﬁrm’s type is its private information.
The proportion l ∈ (0,1) of type a ﬁrms is common knowledge.
There are N ≥ 2 risk neutral banks in the market which can raise any amount of funds at
a unit interest rate. If a bank lends at an interest rate r to α type a ﬁrms and to β type b
ﬁrms then its proﬁt will be α(pa min(X,r) − 1) + β (pb min(X,r) − 1). Banks have access to
an imperfect monitoring technology. The technology assigns each loan applicant to a category
C ∈ {A,B}. We deﬁne
q (C|c) = P {Applicant is assigned to C ∈ {A,B}|Applicant’s type is c ∈ {a,b}}.
We write qc for q (A|c) so that:
q (A|a) = qa, q (B|a) = 1 − qa,
q (A|b) = qb, q (B|b) = 1 − qb.
We do not require, and we do not make, the simplifying assumption qa = 1 − qb characteristic
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of a completely symmetric test.
We adopt Broecker’s assumption that screening is informative but imperfect:
0 < qb < qa < 1. (A1)
It is an easy matter to show as Broecker does that this implies that
¯ pA < ¯ p < ¯ pB,
where ¯ pA and ¯ pB are respectively the average success probability when there is only one bank
of category A and B ﬁrms, and ¯ p is the average success probability of all ﬁrms. We adopt the
following additional assumption from Broecker’s paper, which implies that at least one bank
will not make losses if it charges r = X to category B ﬁrms:
¯ pBX − 1 > 0. (A2)
Broecker also assumes that ¯ pAX −1 < 0, so that banks do not wish to lend to category A ﬁrms.
We will make the slightly stronger assumption that banks do not want to lend to ﬁrms that are
not screened at all. This assumption thus emphasizes the role of banks in credit markets:
¯ pX − 1 < 0. (A3)
Broecker assumes that applying for a loan is costless, and that banks incur no screening
costs. We depart from his model by allowing for application and screening costs:
There is a cost ε > 0 of applying for a loan; (A40)
The cost of screening x applicants is C (x),
where C(0) = C0(0) = 0,C00 ≥ 0 and C(1) < ¯ pBX − 1 (A50)
We introduce the ε cost of loan application so as to ensure that ﬁrms will prefer to apply
sequentially for loans: this avoids duplication of screening costs. The upper bound on the
maximal screening cost is suﬃciently low to ensure that a single bank will proﬁt from making
loans to ﬁrms which pass the screening test.
The loan application process works as follows. Assumptions (A3) and (A1) together imply
that banks will not lend to category A ﬁrms and so in the ﬁrst stage banks simultaneously
announce whether they wish to provide credit and, if they do so, the rate r ∈ [0,X] at which
they will lend to type B ﬁrms. Firms then make sequential applications for loans.1
1In Broecker’s original paper ﬁrms make simultaneous loan applications: our modiﬁcation of his game is
rendered necessary by assumption (A4
0).
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We deﬁne social welfare in this model to be the total present value of all ﬁnanced projects,
less the total screening costs:
W (L) ≡ l
 
1 − qL
a

(paX − 1) + (1 − l)
 
1 − qL
b

(pbX − 1) − LC (f (L)). (1)
Broecker shows (Proposition 2.1) that under assumptions (A1) – (A3) and with no costs
of loan application or of screening, this one-stage game has no equilibrium in pure strategies.
In the following section we demonstrate that for appropriate functions C (·), the additional
assumption (A40) guaranteeing sequential loan applications is suﬃcient to overturn this result.
3. Existence of a Pure Strategy Equilibria
In this section we study the case were the number N of banks is ﬁxed exogenously. We leave
to section 6 the analysis of free entry.
Our analysis runs as follows. We ﬁrstly compute equilibrium bank proﬁts, and also the
proﬁts which a bank obtains by deviating to a higher interest rate. In lemma 2 we demonstrate
that no upward deviation will occur. This is because a higher interest rate will attract worse
quality creditors. Under assumption (A3), which states that unscreened projects have negative
present value, this lower quality is suﬃcient to discourage deviation. We then show that when
screening costs are convex, the minimum bank breal-even interest rate is locally decreasing with
the number of banks around N = 1. We establish in theorem 1 that this is suﬃcient to render
undercutting unattractive and hence to prove the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium.
To compute the banks’ proﬁts ﬁrst need to determine the number of ﬁrms which they screen
in equilibrium, and the number of clients of type a and type b to which they will lend money.
This is the object of the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Consider a situation in which L banks oﬀer the lowest interest rate. Let f (L) be the
number of ﬁrms screened by any of these banks, hk(L) the number of clients of type k (k = a,b).
Then
f (L) =
1
L

l

1 − qL
a
1 − qa

+ (1 − l)

1 − qL
b
1 − qb

.
ha(L) =
l(1 − qL
a)
L
ha(L) =
(1 − l)(1 − qL
b )
L
Proof. The number of type a ﬁrms that are screened precisely k times (k < L) is l(1 − qa)qk−1
a
(as they are assigned to category A the ﬁrst k−1 times, and then to category B). The number
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of type a ﬁrms that are screened exactly L times is lqL−1
a (they are assigned the ﬁrst L − 1
times to category A). So the expected number of screenings for type a ﬁrms equals
l(1 − qa)
L−1 X
k=1
kqk−1
a + lLqL−1
a = l
1 − qL
a
1 − qa
Similarly for type b ﬁrms the expected number of screenings equals
(1 − l)(1 − qb)
L−1 X
k=1
kqk−1
b + (1 − l)LqL−1
b = (1 − l)
1 − qL
b
1 − qb
Given the symmetry between banks, the expected number of screenings equals f(L).
Of all the applicants screened by a particular, bank only those who are assigned to category B
receive a loan. This means that each bank has l(1−qL
a)/L clients of type a, and (1−l)(1−qL
b )/L
clients of type b. 2
Now let L ≤ N be the number of banks which are active in equilibrium. Using the notation
of lemma 1, net of screening costs each active bank earns an expected proﬁt U (r,L) when they
all charge an interest rate r:
U(r,L) = ha(L)(par − 1) + hb(L)(pbr − 1) − C(f(L))
=
l(1 − qL
a)
L
(par − 1) +
(1 − l)(1 − qL
b )
L
(pbr − 1) − C(f(L)).
Suppose that a bank deviates and charges an interest rate r0 > r, while its L−1 competitors
continue to charge r. The deviating bank will screen the lqL−1
a +(1−l)qL−1
b ﬁrms which are not
awarded loans at the other banks. On average, it will give loans to lqL−1
a (1 − qa) ﬁrms of type
a, and (1 − l)qL−1
b (1 − qb) ﬁrms of type b. Its proﬁts will therefore be given by the following
expression:
V (r0,L) = lqL−1
a (1 − qa)(par0 − 1) + (1 − l)qL−1
b (1 − qb)(pbr0 − 1) − C(lqL−1
a + (1 − l)qL−1
b ).
We now deﬁne two types of break-even interest rate:
Deﬁnition 1
1. The lowest interest rate at which the L banks charging it make nonnegative proﬁts is the
solution r0 (L) of
U (r0,L) = 0: r0(L) =
l(1 − qL
a) + (1 − l)(1 − qL
b ) + LC(f(L))
lpa(1 − qL
a) + pb(1 − l)(1 − qL
b )
.
2. When L − 1 banks charge interest rate r, the lowest rate r0 > r at which another bank
could extend loans and break even is
r0
0(L) =
lqL−1
a (1 − qa) + (1 − l)qL−1
b (1 − qb) + C(lqL−1
a + (1 − l)qL−1
b )
lqL−1
a (1 − qa)pa + (1 − l)qL−1
b (1 − qb)pb
.
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We now formulate an assumption regarding the quality of ﬁrms which receive opposing
views from two screenings. Inequality (ES) below states that banks are unwilling to lend to
such ﬁrms,2 so that a bank will discard a positive result from its own screening if it knows that
a competitor has already received a negative result for the same ﬁrm.
lqa(1 − qa)pa + (1 − l)qb(1 − qb)pb
lqa(1 − qa) + (1 − l)qb(1 − qb)
X < 1. (ES)
With a symmetric screening technology such that 1 > qa = 1 − qb > 1/2, obtaining two
opposite results is equivalent to having no test result at all. In this case, the left hand side of
the inequality reduces to ¯ pX and the assumption (ES) is equivalent to assumption (A3). In
general, inequality (ES) is satisﬁed when banks are relatively better at identifying type b than
type a ﬁrms. It certainly holds in the limiting case where 1 > qa > qb = 0 and type b ﬁrms
are perfectly identiﬁed since in this case (ES) reduces to paX < 1. On the other hand, it is not
satisﬁed when 1 = qa > qb > 0 so that the screening technology perfectly identiﬁes type a ﬁrms,
since (ES) then reduces to pbX < 1. Note that (ES) holds independently of L, a point that will
greatly simplify the analysis.
Lemma 2 shows that under (ES), no bank has an incentive to charge a rate higher than its
competitors.
Lemma 2 Suppose that (ES) holds. Then r0
0(L) > X (equivalently, V (X,L) < 0) for all L ≥ 1.
Proof. Clearly,
r0
0(L) ≥
lqL
a(1 − qa) + (1 − l)qL
b (1 − qb)
lqL
a(1 − qa)pa + (1 − l)qL
b (1 − qb)pb
≥
lqa(1 − qa) + (1 − l)qb(1 − qb)
lqa(1 − qa)pa + (1 − l)qb(1 − qb)pb
> X,
The ﬁrst inequality follows from C(·) ≥ 0 , the second inequality holds since
d
dL

lqL
a(1 − qa) + (1 − l)qL
b (1 − qb)
lqL
a(1 − qa)pa + (1 − l)qL
b (1 − qb)pb

=
lqL
aqL
b (lnqa − lnqb)(1 − l)(1 − qa)(1 − qb)(pb − pa)
(lqL
a(1 − qa)pa + (1 − l)qL
b (1 − qb)pb)2 > 0. (2)
so that
lqL
a (1−qa)+(1−l)qL
b (1−qb)
lqL
a (1−qa)pa+(1−l)qL
b (1−qb)pbis an increasing function of L, and the third follows directly
from (ES). 2
Equation (2) implies that when as in Broecker’s paper, C (x) ≡ 0, the minimum breakeven
interest rate r0 (L) is increasing in the number of banks, L. However, for suﬃciently convext
2This assumption was made by Broecker (1990) in the second part of his paper to show existence of a pure
strategy equilibrium when banks can withdraw from the market after observing all interest rates oﬀered.
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cost functions this is untrue. In particular, r0(1) > r0(2) if and only if
l(1 − qa) + (1 − l)(1 − qb) + C(1)
lpa(1 − qa) + pb(1 − l)(1 − qb)
>
l(1 − q2
a) + (1 − l)(1 − q2
b) + 2C(f(2))
lpa(1 − q2
a) + pb(1 − l)(1 − q2
b)
,
which is equivalent to the following convexity condition:
lpa(1 − qa)[(1 + qa)C(1) − 2C(f(2))]
lpa(1 − qa) + (1 − l)pb(1 − qb)
+
(1 − l)pb(1 − qb)[(1 + qb)C(1) − 2C(f(2))]
lpa(1 − qa) + (1 − l)pb(1 − qb)
> l(1 − qa)(1 − qb)(qa − qb)(1 − l)(pb − pa)/(lpa(1 − qa) + (1 − l)pb(1 − qb)). (C)
Note that the right-hand side of (C) is strictly positive and independent of C(·). The left-
hand site of the inequality is a weighted average of (1+qa)C(1)−2C(f(2)) and (1+qb)C(1)−
2C(f(2)). If the weights used were l and (1 − l) respectively, this average would be exactly
equal to zero in case of linear cost function C(·) (since 2f(2) = l(1 + qa) + (1 − l)(1 + qb)), but
in the case of a strictly convex cost function the average is strictly positive.
In the limit case of perfect screening, with qa = 1 and qb = 0, condition (C) boils down
to C(1) > 2C(f(2)). Since f(2) = 1+l
2 , this reduces to C(1) > 2C(1+l
2 ), stating again that
linear costs would not satisfy the condition, and that a degree of convexity is required which is
increasing in l.
We now consider the conditions for the existence of a symmetric pure strategy Nash equi-
librium in an N bank economy. Since N is exogenously given, for large enough N banks will
not earn positive proﬁts if they all oﬀer loans.3 We therefore assume that banks can elect to be
inactive in equilibrium, and that this earns them zero proﬁts.4
A competitive equilibrium with L active banks is characterized by the following three con-
ditions.
Firstly, lending at r should be individually rational for the banks, and borrowing at r should
be individually rational for the ﬁrms:
X ≥ r ≥ r0(L). (PS1)
This implies in particular that U(r,L) ≥ 0, so that no active bank prefers to be inactive.
Secondly, no active bank should wish to lower its interest rate slightly:
U(r,L) ≥ U(r,1) (PS2)
Once (PS1) is satisﬁed, a suﬃcient condition for (PS2) to hold is that 0 ≥ U(r,1), which can
be restated as r ≤ r0(1).
3This is even true if we ignore the screening costs: see Broecker (1990).
4Alternatively, we could weaken the equilibrium concept and modify (PS1) so as to allow banks to bear losses,
which is in line with the idea that the number of banks is ﬁxed in the short run and variable through entry/exit
in the long run. The proof of existence is then simpliﬁed.
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Thirdly, no active bank should beneﬁt from an upward deviation, even to the highest possible
interest rate X:
U(r,L) ≥ V (X,L). (PS3)
Finally, if L < N, so that there are inactive banks, three additional conditions have to be
imposed. We require none of the N − L inactive banks to choose to become active at a lower
interest rate (PS4), at the same interest rate (PS5), or at a higher interest rate (PS6):
U(r,1) ≤ 0 (PS4)
U(r,L + 1) ≤ 0 (PS5)
V (X,L + 1) ≤ 0 (PS6)
These conditions can be expressed in terms of the break-even rate: (PS4) can be restated
as r ≤ r0(1), (PS5) as r ≤ r0(L + 1) and (PS6) as r0
0(L) ≥ X.
We make a number of observations concerning (PS2), the condition which rules out down-
ward deviation. Firstly, when L < N, (PS2) is implied by (PS1) and (PS4): if inactive banks
are dissuaded by losses from undercutting active banks, then neither will active banks wish to
undercut.
Now observe that ∂
∂rU(r,L) < ∂
∂rU(r,1). It follows that when r0 (L) > r0 (1), we have
U (r,L) < U (r,1) for any r ≥ r0(L). Hence when r0 (L) > r0 (1) the possibility of undercutting
rules out an equilibrium with L banks. Finally, since U(r,L) is linear in r, for any L > 1
with r0(L) < r0(1) there exists a unique real number ¯ rL1 such that U(¯ rL1,L) = U(¯ rL1,1).
Equilibrium condition (PS2) can thus be rewritten as r ≤ ¯ rL1.
Theorem 1 Assume that (ES) holds. When screening costs are suﬃciently convex (in partic-
ular, when (C) holds) a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists in which more than one bank is
active and where all active banks charge the same interest rate r. Moreover, in any pure strategy
Nash equilibrium all active banks charge the same interest rate.
Proof. From lemma 2, condition (PS3) is satisﬁed provided U(r,L) ≥ 0. On the other hand, we
know from the ﬁnal condition in (A50) that r0(1) < X and that r0(1) > r0(2) (because of (C)).
Two cases are to be considered. Either (i) r0(1) ≥ r0(2) ≥ ... ≥ r0(N) or (ii) there exists
L∗ < N such that r0(L∗) < min{r0(1),r0(L∗ + 1)}.
We consider ﬁrst case (i): it is clear that it is an equilibrium for all N banks to charge r0(1)
as (PS1) and (PS2) then hold, so does (PS3) and there is no inactive bank (L = N), so (PS4),
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(PS5) and (PS6) are trivially satisﬁed. In fact, the previous arguments apply to show that for
any r ∈ [r0(N),min{X, ¯ rN1}] all N banks charging r is an equilibrium.
Consider now case (ii). Let r ∈ (r0(L∗),min{r0(1),r0(L∗ + 1)}). It is obvious that the
situation in which L∗ banks charge r constitutes a pure strategy equilibrium: by the choice of
r conditions (PS1), (PS4), and (PS5) are satisﬁed. As observed before, this implies that also
(PS2) is satisﬁed, and since r0
0(L) > X for all L by Lemma 2, this implies that V (X,L∗+1) < 0
so that (PS6) is satisﬁed. Since r > r0(L∗), we have U(r,L∗) > 0 and (PS3) follows.
If in a pure strategy equilibrium two active banks charge diﬀerent interest rates, the one
who charges the higher interest rate makes negative proﬁts because of Lemma 2. Hence, active
banks must necessarily charge the same interest rates. 2
Case (i) of the above proof corresponds to a symmetric equilibrium where all banks play
the same strategy while case (ii) corresponds to an asymmetric one that combines some banks
being active while others are inactive.
Theorem 1 rests upon a key diﬀerence between our set-up and Broecker’s. Our convexity
assumption (C) ensures that r0 (L) is not an increasing function as in Broecker’s paper, but
that it has a minimum, either at r0(N) or r0(L∗). Quoting interest rates slightly above this
minimum is a pure strategy equilibrium, as they are inferior to r0 (1), so that undercutting is
never optimal. At the same time, overcharging is never optimal under (ES).
Because it is always optimal for one bank to quote precisely the same rate as its competi-
tors, the equilibrium interest rate is undetermined within the interval [r0(N),min{X, ¯ rN1}] for
the case with no inactive banks and [r0(L∗),min{r0(1),r0(L∗ + 1)}] when only L∗ < N are
active. We do not see the indeterminacy of interest rates as an obstacle or as a negative result.
The speciﬁc characteristics of the credit market when screening is accounted for leads quite
naturally to this result. Any coordination device which allowed us fully to characterize the
equilibrium (Central Bank announcement, colluding to the highest possible interest rate, ...)
would therefore be ad hoc.
One interesting implication of interest rate indeterminancy is that it partially disconnects
credit from the marginal cost of funds. Only in the case of large shocks will some adjustment be
necessary. As interest rates hit the lower bound r0, or the number of active banks has to adjust,
we may switch from one equilibrium to another one. In general, small changes in the model’s
parameters will produce small changes in the rates r0 so that the interest rate r will remain
in the same interval. Hence interest rates will not react immediately to changes in marginal
costs, and in particular to changes in interbank rates. This is of interest, as it is consistent
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with the observation that interest rates for loans change only sporadically, a fact that has been
widely documented in the empirical literature as the “stickiness of loan rates” (see, for instance,
Hannan and Berger, 1991, or Mester, 1994), and which still lacks a fully satisfactory theoretical
justiﬁcation.
In addition to the equilibrium interest rate, the number of active banks is also somewhat
indeterminant. For in case (ii) of the proof of theorem 1, in general more than one number
L∗ satisﬁes the condition r0(L∗) < min{r0(1),r0(L∗ + 1)}. In most cases the sequence r0 (L)
will reach a minimum at some L. There is then an equilibrium at any L∗ ≥ L, provided
r0 (L∗) < r0 (1). This does not mean that the number of active banks is unbounded. The
following lemma establishes in fact that the number of active banks in equilibrium is bounded.
Hence case (i) of the proof of theorem 1 cannot occur if N is suﬃciently large.
Lemma 3
1. Under (A50),
lim
L→∞
LC(f(L)) = 0
and thus
lim
L→∞
r0(L) =
1
lpa + (1 − l)pb
= 1/p
2. Under (A3) and (A50) there exists M such that r0(M) ≤ r0(1) and r0(L) > r0(1) for all
L > M.
Proof. (1) Set γ = [ l
1−qa + 1−l
1−qb]
lim
L→∞
LC(f(L)) = lim
x→0
1
x
C(f(
1
x
))
= lim
x→0
C(x[l

1−q
1/x
a
1−qa

+ (1 − l)

1−q
1/x
b
1−qb

])
x
≤ lim
x→0
C(xγ)
x
= lim
x→0
γC0(xγ)
1
= 0
Since under (A50), C0(0) = 0 and LC(f(L)) ≥ 0 for all L, the result follows.
(2) By assumption (A3), 1/p > X. Since r0(1) < X and limL→∞ r0(L) > X, there exists
M such that r0(M) ≤ r0(1) and r0(L) > r0(1) for all L > M. 2
We know from the observations after the equilibrium conditions (PS1) through (PS6) that
there are no equilibria with L active banks when r0(L) > r0(1). Hence, the lemma implies that
in equilibrium certainly not more than M banks will be active. We will henceforth assume that
there are at most M potential banks.
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4. An Illustrative Example
We now demonstrate that the pure strategy equilibrium conditions (PS1) – (PS6) are compatible
by considering numerical speciﬁcations for the parameters of the model. We also consider welfare
and proﬁts for this example.
Let qa = 0.75, qb = 0.6, pa = 0.3, pb = 0.7, I = 0.4, X = 1.84, and C (x) = 0.02x5. It is easy
to check that assumptions (A1)-(A3) are satisﬁed. It is also easily veriﬁed that the screening
costs are so low that a single bank charging X would make positive proﬁt. (Broecker, 1990,
shows that this follows from (A2) in the case of no screening costs.) Straightforward calculations
yield
r0(1) = 1.81818 > r0(2) = 1.78885 > r0(3) = 1.7854,
r0(4) = 1.79154 < r0(5) = 1.80062 < r0(6) = 1.80989 < r0(1) < r0(n) for n ≥ 7,
r0(n) > X for all n > 11.
We assume that there are N ≥ 12 potential banks in the market. There are no pure strategy
equilibria with one or two active banks, since any inactive bank would make strictly positive
proﬁts by mimicking an active bank. Furthermore, no pure equilibria exist where more than six
banks enter, since these banks can only break even by charging an interest rate strictly above
r0(1), in which case an inactive bank could make a positive proﬁt by undercutting slightly below
r0(1). On the other hand, for L = 3, 4, and 5, it is an equilibrium for L active banks to charge
any interest rate r ∈ [r0(L),r0(L + 1)]. It is also an equilibrium for siz banks to charge any
interest rate r ∈ [r0(6),r0(1)].
Observe that the more banks are active in equilibrium, the higher is the equilibrium interest
rate. The reason for this is twofold: on the one hand, a few banks charging a relatively high
interest rate would provoke entry by additional banks; on the other hand, when many banks
oﬀer the same interest rate, average credit quality is quite low and hence the interest rate must
be quite high to ensure that the banks break even.
The interest rate simply determines a transfer between ﬁrms and banks and hence does
not aﬀect social welfare W (L). Total surplus depends only upon the number of active banks
in equilibrium. With more active banks, more and on average worse projects get ﬁnanced.
This eﬀect is welfare decreasing, but is partially oﬀset by the convexity of the screening cost
function. It can be easily calculated that the total welfare with 3, 4, 5, and 6 banks equals,
W(3) = 0.0318752, W(4) = 0.0279051, W(5) = 0.0226881, and W(6) = 0.0174316, respectively.
Hence, welfare is highest with the least number of banks.
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We now consider bank proﬁts. Obviously, these depend upon the equilibrium interest as
well as the number of active banks. Since for L ∈ {3,4,5,6} it is an equilibrium for L banks
to charge r0 (L), there are always equilibria in which banks make zero proﬁts. We focus upon
the maximal equilibrium proﬁts. Simple calculations yield maximal individual bank proﬁts of
0.000815431, 0.00101624, 0.000888279, and 0.000689513 in the respective cases with 3, 4, 5,
and 6 banks. The highest per-bank proﬁt is obtained with 4 active banks. Joint proﬁts are
maximized with 5 active banks.
5. Comparative Statics
In this section we examine the eﬀect of L upon social welfare and upon bank proﬁtability for
the following speciﬁc cost function:
CS (s) =

 
 
0, s < 1
c, otherwise
(3)
We interpret CS (·) as describing the costs of a capacity-constrained bank. A single bank is just
able to screen all applicants but at a high cost. We assume that c > 0 is such that a single
bank charging X will make small but positive proﬁts and that condition (C) is satisﬁed so that
existence of pure strategy equilibria is guaranteed as before: undercutting is optimal only when
high interest rates are charged.
Proposition 1 When screening costs are given by equation (3), welfare in equilibrium is a
decreasing function of L.
Proof. There is no equilibrium in which just one bank enters. Suppose that there exists an
equilibrium in which L > 1 banks are active, and each charges r∗
L, and that there also exists an
equilibrium with L+1 active banks, each of which charges r∗
L+1. Equilibrium conditions (PS5)
and (PS1) imply that r∗
L ≤ r0(L + 1) ≤ r∗
L+1 ≤ X. The diﬀerence in total welfare between the
two equilibria is
W(L + 1) − W(L)
= l(paX − 1)(qL
a − qL+1
a ) + (1 − l)(pbX − 1)(qL
b − qL+1
b ) − (L + 1)C(f(L + 1)) + LC(f(L))
= V (X,L) + [C(lqL
a + (1 − l)qL
b ) + LC(f(L)) − (L + 1)C(f(L + 1))]. (4)
When screening costs are given by equation (3) and L > 1, the square bracketed term disappears.
Hence
W(L + 1) − W(L) = V (X,L) ≤ 0,
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where the inequality follows from (PS6) in case r∗
L < X: no inactive bank will enter and charge
X when L banks charge r∗
L < X. In the case where r∗
L = X, then r0(L + 1) = r∗
L+1 = X,
which implies that W(L + 1) = 0, as banks would make zero proﬁt and ﬁrms would enjoy no
surplus in the equilibrium with L + 1 active banks. Obviously, also in this case we have that
W(L + 1) − W(L) ≤ 0 2
As a technical aside, we note that, provided the square bracketed term in equation (4) above
is small enough, proposition 1 can be generalised to more general cost functions. For the case
of a linear cost function C(·), the square bracketed term is exactly zero. For a strictly convex
cost function the square bracketed term is positive; however, the proposition goes through in
this case provided V (X,L) is suﬃciently negative. For example, in the numerical example of
section 4 welfare was decreasing in the number of active banks in equilibrium.
6. Entry
We now turn to the case where the number of banks is endogenous. We assume as usual that
entry occurs until the point where an additional bank entering the market would make losses.
In the canonical microeconomic model of entry in a delivery vs. payment type of market, this is
equivalent to ﬁrms making zero proﬁts in the equilibrium, up to an indivisibility. The analysis
in our set-up is more complex, for a number of reasons. Firstly, bank proﬁtability depends
upon equilibrium credit risk, which in turn is determined by the number of active banks. Hence
banks earn proﬁts in the free entry equilibrium not because of indivisibilities or because of the
strategic reaction of incumbents, but because the (N + 1)th bank’s entry increases the costs
of the N incumbent ones. Second, the number of active banks does not fully determine the
equilibrium loan rate. We can therefore speak only of the equilibrium loan rate range and the
equilibrium proﬁt range. Since the equilibrium loan rate can be as low as r0(L) , proﬁts could
be zero for any equilibrium number of banks.
To this point we have ﬁxed the number of N of banks and allowed them to choose to become
active. Although bankers correctly anticipate the number of active banks, they do not know
for sure what this is at the time they set interest rates. Some banks may remain inactive and
we have shown that this is necessarily the case for large N when screening is necessary to make
nonnegative proﬁts. In contrast, when entry is costly we would expect bankers to enter only if
they (correctly) anticipate that they will be active.
We now assume that M potential banks ﬁrst decide whether to enter the market at a small
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sunk cost F. Banks set interest rates and decide whether to be active only after it has been
established how many banks enter. We thus exclude the possibility that a bank will use a hit-
and-run strategy. This assumption is justiﬁed when interest rates can be changed more easily
than banks can be established. In this set-up, a bank’s strategy no longer consists of an interest
rate r at which to provide loans to all applicants passing its screening test. Instead, it has to
set an interest rate r(N) which depends upon the number N of banks in the credit market.
The appropriate solution concept for our sequential entry model is that of subgame perfect
equilibrium. We ﬁrst characterise all subgame perfect equilibria. We show that all banks that
enter will be active, but that the number of banks in the credit market is indeterminate. We
then show that a very mild reﬁnement of the equilibrium concept suﬃces to tie down the precise
number of active banks.
We ﬁrstly deﬁne another break-even interest rate:
Deﬁnition 2 Let rF(L) denote the interest rate at which L banks are able to just recover their
setup cost. i.e., U(rF(L),L) = F.
(i) Characterization of pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria
We ﬁrst consider the second stage when N banks have entered, with 1 ≤ N ≤ M . Since setup
costs are sunk the equilibrium conditions for a pure strategy equilibrium in this subgame are
exactly those outlined in the previous section. If N = 1 the unique bank will obviously set
r = X. If N ≥ 2, L ≤ N banks will set the same interest rate r while the remaining N − L
banks choose to stay inactive. The interest rate r must satisfy conditions (PS1) through (PS6).
We now determine conditions for the existence of a pure strategy subgame perfect equilib-
rium in which exactly L∗ banks enter. Since an inactive bank would deviate and save the setup
cost F, all of these L∗ banks must be active on the equilibrium path of play. At the equilibrium
interest rate r, each bank must cover its setup costs: that is U(r,L∗) ≥ F, or equivalently
r ≥ rF(L∗). Since all L∗ banks are active, equilibrium conditions (PS4) through (PS6) have no
bite. Hence the equilibrium interest rate can be anything between X and the minimal interest
rate needed to break even, net of setup costs.
Finally, if L∗ < M we need a restriction on the interest rate r(L∗ + 1) which the active banks
would set in the hypothetical case where more than one bank enters. This rate must be set to
discourage entry by an (L∗ + 1)th bank. If all banks use the same strategy this implies that
U (r(L∗ + 1),L∗ + 1) ≤ F. Alternatively, in an asymmetric equilibrium with L∗ +1 entrants a
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proper subset would be active and would set an interest rate which ensured that the remaining
banks (including the (L∗ + 1)th) chose to remain inactive. A possible, but not unique, threat
to support the equilibrium would be to set the interest rate equal to r0 (L∗ + 1).
We have proved the following characterization of pure subgame perfect equilibria.
Theorem 2 Assume that (ES) holds. When screening costs are suﬃciently convex (in par-
ticular, when (C) holds) a pure subgame perfect equilibrium exists. For any L∗ ≥ 2 and any
r ≤ X for which U(r,L∗) ≥ F and U(r,L∗) ≥ U(r,1), there is a subgame perfect equilibrium
in which L∗ banks enter and then charge r. Further, in a subgame perfect equilibrium it is also
possible that just one bank enters and then charges the monopolistic interest rate X, threatening
to charge the break-even interest rate r0(2) when another bank enters.
(ii) Equilibrium selection: determining the number of banks
In neither our original model of banking competition with a ﬁxed number of banks, nor in the
model with endogenous entry, is either the number of active banks or the interest rate uniquely
determined. We can therefore view competition between banks as a double coordination prob-
lem: how many banks should enter, and which interest rate should they set?
At ﬁrst sight the indeterminancy appears more severe in the case of endogenous entry since
the equilibrium interest rate with more than one bank can go all the way up to min{X, ¯ rM1}.
Moreover, monopolistic credit markets are also possible in this set-up. However, there is an
important diﬀerence between the equilibria of the two models. With a ﬁxed number of banks
almost all equilibria are strict, in the sense that any deviation from the equilibrium strategy
leads to a strict loss for the deviator. All such equilibria are therefore very stable and robust.
In contrast, none of the equilibria in the model with endogenous entry is strict. For example,
consider a subgame perfect equilibrium in which L∗ ≥ 2 banks enter and set r(L∗) = r,
r(L) = r0 (L) for L / ∈ {1,L∗} and r(1) = X. For any bank which enters in equilibrium the only
optimal interest rate is the one set by all other banks. In this sense, the equilibrium is strict.
But banks have much more freedom in the unreached subgames: they can change their interest
rate oﬀ the equilibrium path when L 6= L∗ banks enter. This multiplicity of best replies for any
bank destabilizes many (subgame perfect) equilibria. In order to select between the equilibria
we apply the concept of a minimal curb set.
Deﬁnition 3 (Basu and Weibull, 1991) A non-empty cartesian set of pure strategy proﬁles
Y = Y1 ×···×YM is a curb set if for all y ∈ Y and for any strategy zi of player i that is a best
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reply against y, zi ∈ Yi. Y is a minimal curb set if it is a curb set and no strict subset Y 0 ⊂ Y
is a curb set.
A minimal curb set can be viewed as the set-valued extension of a strict Nash equilibrium.
While strict Nash equilibria are not guaranteed to exist, Basu and Weibull (1991) have shown
that in games with compact strategy sets and continuous payoﬀs, minimal curb sets do exist.
Moreover, any minimal curb set contains the support of at least one Nash equilibrium. Hurkens
(1995) shows how boundedly rational players may learn to play strategies from a minimal curb
set.
In our model, payoﬀs are not continuous as banks can sometimes improve their proﬁts by
slightly undercutting their competitors. To avoid the problem of non-existence of best replies
we assume that interest rates have to be chosen from a ﬁnite but ﬁne grid {0,∆,2∆,··· ,K∆}
where ∆ > 0 is small and K∆ = X.5 We show that in any minimal curb set all banks enter
and then all charge the same interest rate which allows them to obtain strictly positive proﬁts.
Theorem 3 For each r ∈ (rF(M),min{X, ¯ rM1}], there exists one minimal curb set Y r. The
set Y r consists of all pure strategies that tell the bank to enter and charge r when exactly M
banks enter. There are no other minimal curb sets.
Proof. Fix r ∈ (rF(M),min{X, ¯ rM1}] and let the set Y r consist of all pure strategies that tell
the bank to enter and charge r when exactly M banks enter.
First, it is clear that the set Y r is closed under rational behavior as all best replies are
exactly the strategies to enter and charge r when all banks enter. By the same argument, the
set is a minimal curb set.
Second, we need to show that there are no other minimal curb sets. Suppose on the contrary
that there is a diﬀerent minimal curb set Y . Let y ∈ Y be a pure strategy proﬁle and let L
be the number of banks that enter according to this proﬁle. We will show that Y ∩ Y r 6= ∅ for
some Y r. This then implies that Y r ⊂ Y which proves the statement. We will use induction by
L.
First consider L = 0. Clearly, a best reply for any bank i against y is to enter and charge X
when it is the only bank to enter and to charge r if all banks enter (and to charge for example
also r when a diﬀerent number of banks enter). Clearly, the proﬁle of best replies is an element
of Y r.
5Alternatively, we could choose to work with the concept of sets closed under better replies, introduced by
Ritzberger and Weibull (1995).
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Next consider L = 1. A best reply for the one bank that enters against the strategy proﬁle
y is to enter and charge X if it is the only bank, to charge rF(2) if two banks enter, and to
charge r if M banks enter. Hence, this strategy must be in the curb set. A best reply of any
other bank against this strategy is to use exactly the same strategy, that is, to enter and charge
rF(2) if two banks enter and to charge r if M banks enter. It follows that Y ∩ Y r 6= ∅.
Let us now make the induction step: assume that for curb sets Y containing strategy proﬁles
in which 0, 1, ..., or L < M banks enter, we know that Y ∩ Y r 6= ∅ for some r. Now consider a
curb set Y with a strategy proﬁle y in which L + 1 banks enter.
First, consider the case where not all banks charge the same interest rate when all enter.
In this case the bank which charges the highest interest rate will make a loss. Its best reply
is either (i) decide not to enter, (ii) decide to enter but match the lowest interest rate or (iii)
decide to enter and undercut the lowest interest rate by ∆. Whatever the best reply is, it must
be contained in the curb set. By repeating the argument repeatedly we will either obtain a
strategy proﬁle y0 in which only L banks enter, or we obtain a strategy proﬁle y00 in which all
L + 1 banks charge the same interest rate from which no banks desires to deviate. In the ﬁrst
case we can apply the induction hypothesis to show that Y ∩ Y r 6= ∅ for some r. In the second
case we have obtained a Nash equilibrium in the curb set in which L + 1 banks enter and then
charge some interest rate r0. If L + 1 = M, we are done. If L + 1 < M we need to do one
additional step. A best reply for each of the L+1 banks is to enter and charge r if L+1 banks
enter, charge r if M banks enter and charge rF(L + 2) + ∆ if L + 2 < M banks enter. These
best replies must be contained in the curb set. But the best reply for each of the inactive banks
against these latter strategies is then to enter and use the same interest rate strategy. Again,
it follows that Y ∩ Y r 6= ∅ for some r. 2
We summarize our ﬁndings as follows. The only (subgame perfect) equilibria that are
contained in minimal curb sets are those in which the maximal number of banks enter and
charge an interest rate which allows them to make strictly positive proﬁts while not giving any
banks an incentive to deviate. All such interest rates are possible and plausible and we cannot
distinguish between them without making further, ad hoc, assumptions.
We do not see the indeterminacy of interest rates as an obstacle or as a negative result. We
believe it is in line with observed interest rate stickiness. If we were able to select a unique
interest rate as the only plausible one, then this interest rate would necessarily depend in a
speciﬁc way on the parameters of the model. So the equilibrium interest rate would immediately
adjust in response to a small shock to these parameters.
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Since we are actually able to predict only that the maximal number of banks should enter
and charge an interest rate which yields a positive proﬁt, small shocks to the model parameters
would most likely not aﬀect the interest rate. Hence, interest rate adjustment is necessary in
our model only in response to large shocks. This is consistent with the observation that interest
rates change only sporadically.
7. Heterogeneous Monitoring Skills
In this section, we consider an extension of our model in which some banks are endowed with a
better monitoring technology than the others. Speciﬁcally, we assume that these superior banks
have a monitoring technology ˆ qa, ˆ qb which satisﬁes the following assumptions:
ˆ qa > qa;
ˆ qb < qb.
Superior banks will thus reject less good (type b) ﬁrms and reject more bad (type a) ﬁrms
than inferior banks do. The adverse selection eﬀect is thus stronger in the presence of superior
competitors. On the other hand, the adverse selection eﬀect is less strong for superior banks
than it is for inferior banks. This is most easily seen in the extreme case that superior banks
have perfect monitoring technologies.
The existence and characterization of pure strategy equilibria will obviously depend on the
number of inferior and superior banks, on how much better the superior technology is, and on
the exact screening cost. In this Section we will assume that screening costs are given by (3)
so that both superior and inferior banks have capacity constraints. Let us assume that ﬁrms
know the quality of monitoring of each bank. When all the banks charge the same interest rate,
ﬁrms will apply to the bank where they have the highest probability of being granted a loan.
Hence, all type b ﬁrms will in ﬁrst instance apply to the superior banks, while type a ﬁrms will
exhaust the supply of inferior banks before applying to a superior bank. Hence, the inferior
banks suﬀer from a “cherry-picking externality” (Morrison and White, 2004). If condition (ES)
holds, an active inferior bank will make losses whenever a superior bank charges the same or
a lower interest rate. Hence, in a pure strategy equilibrium either no inferior bank is active or
two or more inferior banks charge the same low interest rate while one or more superior banks
charge a much higher interest rate.
We are able to show that equilibria of the ﬁrst type will certainly exist, provided that at
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least two banks have the superior technology.6 Namely, applying the construction of Section 3
applied to a model in which all banks have the superior monitoring technology, one ﬁnds that
a number of superior banks coordinating on the same interest rate below r0(1) will constitute
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in this adjusted model. Obviously, inferior banks can do no
better than remain inactive.
Theorem 4 Suppose that there are at least two banks with superior technology (ˆ qa, ˆ qb) with
ˆ qa > qa and ˆ qb < qb. Suppose furthermore that inequality (ES) holds when qa and qb are
replaced by ˆ qa and ˆ qb, respectively. Then there exists a pure strategy equilibrium in which only
superior banks are active, and all pure strategy equilibria are of this type.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of theorem 1. 2
This straightforward extension of theorem 1 is of interest for several reasons. First, the
equilibrium we are envisaging is one where the number of active banks is limited by the access
they have to the superior technology. Second, if the acquisition of the superior technology is
the result of learning by doing, then it fully justiﬁes Shaﬀer’s (1998) idea of a winner’s curse in
the market for credit.
8. Conclusion
In this paper we explore credit market equilibrium when banks perform costly screening. When
the screening technology is suﬃciently accurate and suﬃciently convex, we are able to prove
that pure strategy equilibria exist. This complements Broecker’s (1990) result that there is no
pure strategy equilibrium when screening is costless. Moreover, equilibrium prices in our model
are the result of a coordination process. This implies the existence of positive equilibrium proﬁts
as well as a disconnect between marginal cost and prices.
Finally, a substantial literature has argued that welfare is enhanced by allowing banks to
extract rents from their lending relationships. The prior literature has typically argued that
this rent is required to satisfy a screening incentive compatibility constraint. We approach this
problem from an alternative perspective. Proposition 1 shows that, in general, an increase in
the number of banks will decrease welfare. The reason in our model is that a higher number
of banks raises the probability that a bad creditor will obtain a loan after visiting all of them.
6The second type of equilibrium, in which inferior banks charge low interest rates and superior banks charge
high interest rates, may exist in very special cases. However, we were not able to ﬁnd parameters consistent with
the model and satisfying this condition.
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Our work therefore provides a new argument to support the policy recommendation that entry
to the credit market should be restricted.
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